Frases de Henry Hazlitt

“La sencillez de carácter es el resultado natural del pensamiento profundo.”

“El único vicio que no puede perdonarse es la hipocresía. El arrepentimiento del hipócrita es de por sí una hipocresía.”

“La mejor forma para recibir insultos es sometiéndose a ellos. Si el hombre respeta, será respetado.”

“El arte de la Economía consiste en considerar los efectos más remotos de cualquier acto o medida política y no meramente sus consecuencias inmediatas; en calcular las repercusiones de tal política no sobre un grupo, sino sobre todos los sectores.”

“La prosperidad es un gran maestro; la adversidad es mucho más grande. La posesión embota la mente, la adversidad la fortalece.”

La economía en una lección (Laissez Faire)

“El mal economista sólo ve lo que se advierte de un modo inmediato, mientras que el buen economista percibe también más allá.”

Henry Hazlitt Frases y Citas

“El más diminuto dolor en nuestro dedo pequeño nos preocupa más que la destrucción de millones de nuestros semejantes en el mundo entero.”

La economía en una lección (Laissez Faire)

“La peor vejez es la del espíritu.”

“Cuando más hacemos, más podemos hacer; cuando estamos más ocupados es cuando tenemos más tiempo para divertirnos.”

“El gobierno es incapaz de darnos algo sin despojarnos de algo más.”

“El público no tiene ni vergüenza ni gratitud.”

“Las reglas y los modelos destruyen al genio y al arte.”

“El hombre es el único animal que ríe y llora, porque es el único que percibe la diferencia entre lo que las cosas son y lo que deben ser.”

“El silencio es un gran arte para la conversación.”

“Resulta indispensable cierta cantidad de gasto público para cumplir las funciones esenciales del gobierno. Un buen número de obras públicas -calles, carreteras, puentes y túneles, arsenales y astilleros, edificios para los cuerpos legislativos, la policía y los bomberos- son necesarias para atender los servicios públicos indispensables. La realización de estas obras públicas, útiles por sí mismas y por tanto necesarias, no conciernen a nuestro estudio. Me voy a referir aquí a las obras públicas consideradas como medio de «combatir el paro», o de proporcionar a la comunidad una riqueza que de otro modo no podríamos disfrutar.
Se ha construido un puente. Si se ha hecho así para atender una insistente demanda pública; si con tal construcción se resuelve un problema de tráfico o de transporte que de otro modo hubiera sido insoluble; si, en una palabra, incluso es más necesario que las cosas en las que los contribuyentes hubiesen gastado su dinero, de no haber sido gravados con dichos impuestos, nada cabe objetar. Pero un puente que se construye básicamente «para proporcionar trabajo» es de una clase muy distinta. Cuando el
proporcionar empleo se convierte en finalidad, la necesidad pasa a ser una cuestión secundaria. En semejante situación se inventan los «proyectos». En lugar de pensar sólo dónde deben construirse los puentes, los burócratas empiezan por preguntarse dónde pueden ser construidos. Se buscan unas razones que resulten aceptables para que un nuevo puente una la zona este con la zona oeste. Y de este modo, el puente se convierte inmediatamente en una necesidad absoluta; y aquellos que expongan alguna duda sobre la necesidad de semejante construcción son destituidos por obstruccionistas y reaccionarios.
Dos son los argumentos que se formulan a favor de la construcción del puente: el primero se argumenta principalmente antes de su construcción; el segundo, cuando ya está terminado. En el primero se afirma que tal obra proporcionará trabajo. Facilitará, digámoslo así, quinientos empleos durante un año. Unos empleos que, de otro modo, jamás hubiesen existido.
Esto es lo que se puede ver a primera vista. Pero si disponemos de cierta práctica en considerar las consecuencias remotas sobre las inmediatas y tenemos en cuenta a quienes se ven indirectamente afectados por el proyecto gubernamental, en lugar de concentrarnos simplemente en quienes se benefician de él de una manera directa, el cuadro ofrece perspectivas bien distintas. Es cierto que un grupo determinado de obreros encontrará una colocación de la que, de otro modo, hubieran carecido. Pero la obra ha sido realizada con el dinero conseguido mediante los impuestos. Cada dólar gastado en el puente tendrá que ser pagado por los contribuyentes. Si el puente cuesta diez millones de dólares, los contribuyentes tendrán que pagar esos diez millones. Por tal motivo se encontrarán con que no pueden emplear ese dinero en las cosas que más necesitaban.”

“Al dejar para ulterior examen la maraña de sofismas íntimamente relacionados con la deuda pública y la inflación crónicas, habremos de dejar bien sentado a través de este capítulo que de una manera inmediata o remota cada dólar que el gobierno gasta procede inexcusablemente de un dólar obtenido a través del impuesto. Cuando consideramos la cuestión de esta manera, los supuestos milagros de las inversiones estatales aparecen a una luz muy distinta. Una”

Economía en una lección

“Laméntase a menudo que los demagogos logren mayor asenso al exponer públicamente sus despropósitos económicos que los hombres de bien al denunciar sus fallos.”

La economía en una lección (Laissez Faire)

“Nos encontramos, pues, con la falacia que pasa por alto las consecuencias secundarias.
Es en esto en donde se asienta la diferencia fundamental entre la buena y la mala economía. El mal economista sólo ve lo que se advierte de un modo inmediato, mientras que el bueno percibe también lo que va más allá. El primero tan sólo contempla las consecuencias directas de la medida a aplicar, mientras que el segundo presta atención también a las indirectas y más lejanas. Aquél sólo considera los efectos que una determinada política ha tenido, o puede tener, sobre cierto sector; éste se preocupa también de los efectos que tal política ejercerá sobre todos los grupos.”

La economía en una lección (Laissez Faire)

“Naturalmente, cabe incidir en el error contrario. Al ponderar un cierto programa económico no debemos atenernos exclusivamente a sus resultados remotos sobre toda la comunidad. Es éste un error que a menudo cometieron los economistas clásicos, lo cual engendró una cierta insensibilidad frente a la desgracia de aquellos sectores que resultaban inmediatamente perjudicados por unas directrices o sistemas que a largo plazo beneficiarían a la colectividad.”

Economía en una lección

“las intervenciones de los gobiernos sólo tienen en cuenta las consecuencias que saltan a la vista, pero ignoran las que no se ven”

La economía en una lección (Laissez Faire)

“La Economía se halla asediada por mayor número de sofismas que cualquier otra disciplina cultivada por el hombre.”

La economía en una lección (Laissez Faire)

“el sofisma básico de la «nueva» Economía, consiste en concentrar la atención sobre los efectos inmediatos de cierto plan en relación con sectores concretos e ignorar o minimizar sus remotas repercusiones sobre toda la comunidad.”

La economía en una lección (Laissez Faire)

“Todo el evangelio de Karl Marx puede resumirse en una frase : Odia a quien esté mejor que tú.”

La economía en una lección (Laissez Faire)

“The art of economics consists in looking not merely at the immediate but at the longer effects of any act or policy; it consists in tracing the consequences of that policy not merely for one group but for all groups.”

Henry Hazlitt: Frases en inglés

“The 'private sector' of the economy is, in fact, the voluntary sector; and the 'public sector' is, in fact, the coercive sector.”

Henry Hazlitt libro La economía en una lección

Economics in One Lesson (1946), The Lesson (ch. 1)

“When the government makes loans or subsidies to business, what it does is to tax successful private business in order to support unsuccessful private business.”

“Suppose a clothing manufacturer learns of a machine that will make men’s and women's overcoats for half as much labor as previously. He installs the machines and drops half his labor force.This looks at first glance like a clear loss of employment. But the machine itself required labor to make it; so here, as one offset, are jobs that would not otherwise have existed. The manufacturer, how ever, would have adopted the machine only if it had either made better suits for half as much labor, or had made the same kind of suits at a smaller cost. If we assume the latter, we cannot assume that the amount of labor to make the machines was as great in terms of pay rolls as the amount of labor that the clothing manufacturer hopes to save in the long run by adopting the machine; otherwise there would have been no economy, and he would not have adopted it.So there is still a net loss of employment to be accounted for. But we should at least keep in mind the real possibility that even the first effect of the introduction of labor-saving machinery may be to increase employment on net balance; because it is usually only in the long run that the clothing manufacturer expects to save money by adopting the machine: it may take several years for the machine to "pay for itself."After the machine has produced economies sufficient to offset its cost, the clothing manufacturer has more profits than before. (We shall assume that he merely sells his coats for the same price as his competitors, and makes no effort to undersell them.) At this point, it may seem, labor has suffered a net loss of employment, while it is only the manufacturer, the capitalist, who has gained. But it is precisely out of these extra profits that the subsequent social gains must come. The manufacturer must use these extra profits in at least one of three ways, and possibly he will use part of them in all three: (1) he will use the extra profits to expand his operations by buying more machines to make more coats; or (2) he will invest the extra profits in some other industry; or (3) he will spend the extra profits on increasing his own consumption. Whichever of these three courses he takes, he will increase employment.”

“I do not mean to suggest that all those who call themselves monetarists make this unconscious assumption that an inflation involves this uniform rise of prices. But we may distinguish two schools of monetarism. The first would prescribe a monthly or annual increase in the stock of money just sufficient, in their judgment, to keep prices stable. The second school (which the first might dismiss as mere inflationists) wants a continuous increase in the stock of money sufficient to raise prices steadily by a "small" amount—2 or 3 per cent a year. These are the advocates of a "creeping" inflation. … I made a distinction earlier between the monetarists strictly so called and the "creeping inflationists." This distinction applies to the intent of their recommended policies rather than to the result. The intent of the monetarists is not to keep raising the price "level" but simply to keep it from falling, i. e., simply to keep it "stable." But it is impossible to know in advance precisely what uniform rate of money-supply increase would in fact do this. The monetarists are right in assuming that in a prospering economy, if the stock of money were not increased, there would probably be a mild long-run tendency for prices to decline. But they are wrong in assuming that this would necessarily threaten employment or production. For in a free and flexible economy prices would be falling because productivity was increasing, that is, because costs of production were falling. There would be no necessary reduction in real profit margins. The American economy has often been prosperous in the past over periods when prices were declining. Though money wage-rates may not increase in such periods, their purchasing power does increase. So there is no need to keep increasing the stock of money to prevent prices from declining. A fixed arbitrary annual increase in the money stock "to keep prices stable" could easily lead to a "creeping inflation" of prices.”

Henry Hazlitt libro La economía en una lección

Economics in One Lesson (1946), The Curse of Machinery (ch. 7)

“It is with considerable reluctance that I criticize the monetarists, because, though I consider their proposed monetary policy unfeasible, they are after all much more nearly right in their assumptions and prescriptions than the majority of present academic economists. The simplistic form of the quantity theory of money that they hold is not tenable; but they are overwhelmingly right in insisting on how much "money matters," and they are right in insisting that in most circumstances, and over the long run, it is the quantity of money that is most influential in determining the purchasing power of the monetary unit. Other things being equal, the more dollars that are issued, the smaller becomes the value of each individual dollar. So at the moment the monetarists are more effective opponents of further inflation than the great bulk of politicians and even putative economists who still fail to recognize this basic truth.”

Where the Monetarists Go Wrong (1976)

“Let us begin with the simplest illustration possible: let us, emulating Bastiat, choose a broken pane of glass.A young hoodlum, say, heaves a brick through the window of a baker’s shop. The shopkeeper runs out furious, but the boy is gone. A crowd gathers, and begins to stare with quiet satisfaction at the gaping hole in the window and the shattered glass over the bread and pies. After a while the crowd feels the need for philosophic reflection. And several of its members are almost certain to remind each other or the baker that, after all, the misfortune has its bright side. It will make business for some glazier. As they begin to think of this they elaborate upon it. How much does a new plate glass window cost? Fifty dollars? That will be quite a sum. After all, if windows were never broken, what would happen to the glass business? Then, of course, the thing is endless. The glazier will have $50 more to spend with other merchants, and these in turn will have $50 more to spend with still other merchants, and so ad infinitum. The smashed window will go on providing money and employment in ever-widening circles. The logical conclusion from all this would be, if the crowd drew it, that the little hoodlum who threw the brick, far from being a public menace, was a public benefactor.Now let us take another look. The crowd is at least right in its first conclusion. This little act of vandalism will in the first instance mean more business for some glazier. The glazier will be no more unhappy to learn of the incident than an undertaker to learn of a death. But the shopkeeper will be out $50 that he was planning to spend for a new suit. Because he has had to replace a window, he will have to go without the suit (or some equivalent need or luxury). Instead of having a window and $50 he now has merely a window. Or, as he was planning to buy the suit that very afternoon, instead of having both a window and a suit he must be content with the window and no suit. If we think of him as a part of the community, the community has lost a new suit that might otherwise have come into being, and is just that much poorer.The glazier’s gain of business, in short, is merely the tailor’s loss of business. No new “employment” has been added. The people in the crowd were thinking only of two parties to the transaction, the baker and the glazier. They had forgotten the potential third party involved, the tailor. They forgot him precisely because he will not now enter the scene. They will see the new window in the next day or two. They will never see the extra suit, precisely because it will never be made. They see only what is immediately visible to the eye.”

Where the Monetarists Go Wrong (1976)

“Every man knows there are evils in this world which need setting right. Every man has pretty definite ideas as what these evils are. But to most men one in particular stands out vividly. To some, in fact, this stands out with such startling vividness that they lose sight of other evils, or look upon them as the natural consequence of their own particular evil-in-chief.”

Henry Hazlitt libro La economía en una lección

Economics in One Lesson (1946), The Broken Window (ch. 2)

“In brief, on net balance, machines, technological improvements, economies and efficiency do not throw men out of work.”

Henry Hazlitt, Thinking As A Science (1916).

“The spread-the-work schemes, in brief, rest on the same sort of illusion that we have been considering. The people who support such schemes think only of the employment they would provide for particular persons or groups; they do not stop to consider what their whole effect would be on everybody.The spread-the-work schemes rest also, as we began by pointing out, on the false assumption that there is just a fixed amount of work to be done. There could be no greater fallacy. There is no limit to the amount of work to be done as long as any human need or wish that work could fill remains unsatisfied. In a modern exchange economy, the most work will be done when prices, costs, and wages are in the best relations to each other.”

Henry Hazlitt libro La economía en una lección

Economics in One Lesson (1946), The Curse of Machinery (ch. 7)

“In the last decade or two there has grown up in this country, principally under the leadership of Professor Milton Friedman, a school calling itself the Monetarists. The leaders sometimes sum up their doctrine in the phrase: "Money matters," and even sometimes in the phrase: "Money matters most."”

Henry Hazlitt libro La economía en una lección

Economics in One Lesson (1946), Spread-the-Work Schemes (ch. 8)

“But this brings us to what I consider the fatal flaw in the monetarist prescriptions. If the leader of the school cannot make up his own mind regarding what the most desirable rate of monetary increase should be, what does he expect to happen when the decision is put in the hands of the politicians? … The fatal flaw in the monetarist prescription, in brief, is that it postulates that money should consist of irredeemable paper notes and that the final power of determining how many of these are issued should be placed in the hands of the government—that is, in the hands of the politicians in office. The assumption that these politicians could be trusted to act responsibly, particularly for any prolonged period, seems incredibly naive. The real problem today is the opposite of what the monetarists suggest. It is how to get the arbitrary power over the stock of money out of the hands of the government, out of the hands of the politicians.”

Where the Monetarists Go Wrong (1976)

“Among the most viable of all economic delusions is the belief that machines on net balance create unemployment. Destroyed a thousand times, it has risen a thousand times out of its own ashes as hardy and vigorous as ever. Whenever there is long-continued mass unemployment, machines get the blame anew. This fallacy is still the basis of many labor union practices. The public tolerates these practices because it either believes at bottom that the unions are right, or is too confused to see just why they are wrong. The belief that machines cause unemployment, when held with any logical consistency, leads to preposterous conclusions. Not only must we be causing unemployment with every technological improvement we make today, but primitive man must have started causing it with the first efforts he made to save himself from needless toil and sweat.”

Where the Monetarists Go Wrong (1976)

“So we have finished with the broken window. An elementary fallacy. Anybody, one would think, would be able to avoid it after a few moments’ thought. Yet the broken-window fallacy, under a hundred disguises, is the most persistent in the history of economics. It is more rampant now than at any time in the past. It is solemnly reaffirmed every day by great captains of industry, by chambers of commerce, by labor union leaders, by editorial writers and newspaper columnists and radio commentators, by learned statisticians using the most refined techniques, by professors of economics in our best universities. In their various ways they all dilate upon the advantages of destruction.”

Henry Hazlitt libro La economía en una lección

Economics in One Lesson (1946), The Curse of Machinery (ch. 7)

“It is often sadly remarked that the bad economists present their errors to the public better than the good economists present their truths. It is often complained that demagogues can be more plausible in putting forward economic nonsense from the platform than the honest men who try to show what is wrong with it. But the basic reason for this ought not to be mysterious. The reason is that the demagogues and bad economists are presenting half-truths. They are speaking only of the immediate effect of a proposed policy or its effect upon a single group. As far as they go they may often be right. In these cases the answer consists in showing that the proposed policy would also have longer and less desirable effects, or that it could benefit one group only at the expense of all other groups. The answer consists in supplementing and correcting the half-truth with the other half. But to consider all the chief effects of a proposed course on everybody often requires a long, complicated, and dull chain of reasoning. Most of the audience finds this chain of reasoning difficult to follow and soon becomes bored and inattentive. The bad economists rationalize this intellectual debility and laziness by assuring the audience that it need not even attempt to follow the reasoning or judge it on its merits because it is only “classicism” or “laissez-faire,” or “capitalist apologetics” or whatever other term of abuse may happen to strike them as effective.”

Henry Hazlitt libro La economía en una lección

Economics in One Lesson (1946), The Blessings of Destruction (ch. 3)

“Though some of them would disdain to say that there are net benefits in small acts of destruction, they see almost endless benefits in enormous acts of destruction. They tell us how much better off economically we all are in war than in peace. They see “miracles of production” which it requires a war to achieve. And they see a postwar world made certainly prosperous by an enormous “accumulated” or “backed up” demand. In Europe they joyously count the houses, the whole cities that have been leveled to the ground and that “will have to be replaced.” In America they count the houses that could not be built during the war, the nylon stockings that could not be supplied, the worn-out automobiles and tires, the obsolescent radios and refrigerators. They bring together formidable totals.It is merely our old friend, the broken-window fallacy, in new clothing, and grown fat beyond recognition. This time it is supported by a whole bundle of related fallacies. It confuses need with demand.”

Henry Hazlitt libro La economía en una lección

Economics in One Lesson (1946), The Lesson (ch. 1)